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A
genesis of the process of building representative institutions, irre-
spective of varying circumstances depending upon the specifics of 
historical events in individual countries, always used to be connected 
with the needs of a court. These needs usually concerned financial matters. The 
necessity to give a consent for taxation or accept a successor on the throne re-
quired some form of a contact to be established between a court and a society. 
A parliamentary debate became such a form. A parliament started to play its 
primary role, becoming a dialogue tool for both parties. 
The need to endorse royal decisions resulted in the documents issued since 
the end of the 12th century to the second half of the fourteenth century, grant-
ing specific rights to assemblies: a privilege for the Kingdom of Leon, Magna 
Charta Libertatum, a  constitution for the Kingdom of Sicily or prerogatives 
granted to States-General in 1355-57. The procedures of such a dialogue in 
various European monarchies had a similar form. 
The analogy was visible in structural, procedural and functional elements. 
In the sphere of structure all assemblies united representatives of social class-
es, that is why beside the representation of lieges having its roots still in the 
king’s advisory councils delegates from towns started to appear. Development 
of urban centres and their related financial standing constituted a key factor in 
relations with a monarch. The increasing significance of towns was reflected 
in inclusion of their representation into the group of parliament members. In 
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certain states an analogical factor had an impact on a decision to allow delegates 
from the peasant strata to participate in debates. By way of a political practice, 
the initially joint debates of the whole assembly were replaced with a discussion 
within the group of representatives of individual classes. 
This process was evolving towards a multi-chamber system. Similarities in 
the procedural issue relate both to the general course of an assembly session and 
to the work in individual chambers. As a result of gradual development of rep-
resentations a work plan was worked out, which was later on translated into an 
official opening ceremony, a debate in parliamentary chambers and a procedure 
of the assembly closing. In certain parliaments an element of plenary sessions 
appeared, the purpose of which was to sum up the discussions and to work out 
a final standpoint of both parties of a dialogue. The assembly and the royalty 
communicated through mutual formulas, which from the assembly side came 
down to presentation of petitions, sometimes taking a form of bills, while on 
the court side, as a rule—to financial demands. 
One form of a parliamentary initiative was also to file complaints about 
functioning of state administration, known as gravamins. Regardless of a de-
cisive role of a monarch in shaping the state legislation, one must take into 
account the fact that decisions or amendments to that legislation were usually 
consistent with the proposals put forward by assemblies. The awareness that 
minions must give their consent for the imposition of taxes was a key element 
in relations between a king and an assembly. An element of tender gave a sense 
to a  political dialogue, because a  consent for collection of cash undermined 
the power of a monarch by forcing him to negotiate with minions. A decision 
approving taxation limited the royal authority to a greater extent when it was 
taken after acceptance of presented petitions, while to a lesser extent—when the 
sequence of actions was opposite. However, irrespective of the sequence of those 
decisions a monarchical power cannot be deemed absolute. 
The functional analogy relates to the prerogatives, which in course of evo-
lution were granted to parliamentary assemblies. A preliminary role played by 
those institutions, many times referred to above, was to give a consent for taxa-
tion. Irrespective of the financial function performed, assemblies had a narrow-
er or wider legislative initiative as well as the influence on election of a monarch 
or acceptance of his successor. They also many times performed functions relat-
ing to judiciary. An evident similarity of structures and procedures relating to 
the middle-age parliamentarianism may be an evidence of the political system 
identity typical of the then European states. However, the further history of 
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Europe clearly points at gradually increasing discrepancies due to the political 
situation prevailing in each of those countries. Nevertheless, we can see on one 
side a dualism leading to the development of a parliamentary form of govern-
ment, but on the other—evolution towards absolute power. 
The history of European assemblies clearly indicates that their development 
line split and run into two different directions. On one side development of 
the parliament institution was observed, as the fullest and most effective ma-
terialization of political dialogue within the mixed political system. This status 
quo was exemplified by political systems of three states: First Polish Republic1, 
the Republic of Venice and the Kingdom of England. On the extreme to those 
states, which practically had a  parliamentary government, there were many 
countries with the power system reflecting absolute tendencies, an evident ex-
ample being the Kingdom of France. The limit of powers gained by the then 
assembly in the half of the fourteenth century did not mobilize its members to 
continue fighting for further rights. An adoption of the fixed tax rate put an end 
to the States-General development process, which had an essential impact on 
a decision to totally stop convening assemblies. The fact that the States-General 
did not proceed for 175 years is a clear evidence of resignation from keeping up 
appearances of functioning of a parliamentary government. 
In a range of countries implementing the French model the appearances 
of a parliamentary life were still kept up. The representation assemblies could 
freely exist, but were deprived of any prerogatives. Such situation was observed 
1 J. Ekes, Trójpodział władzy i zgoda wszystkich, Siedlce 2002; idem Złota Demokracja, 
Warszawa 1987, Proces kompozycji ustroju mieszanego Rzeczypospolitej, [in:] Dziedzictwo 
pierwszej Rzeczypospolitej w doświadczeniu politycznym Polski i Europy, J. Ekes, Nowy Sącz 
2005: 53-68; J. Byliński, Dwa sejmy z roku 1613, Wrocław 1984, idem Sejm z roku 1611, 
Wrocław 1970; J. Maciszewski, Kultura polityczna Polski ”złotego wieku”, [in:] Dzieje kultury 
politycznej w  Polsce J. A. Gierowski, Warszawa 1977; S. Ochmann, Sejmy z  lat 1661-
62, Przegrana batalia o  reformę ustroju Rzeczypospolitej, [in:] AUW, 355, Historia XXIX, 
Wrocław 1977; Sejmy z  lat 1615-1616, Wrocław 1970; Rzeczpospolita jako „monarchia 
mixta”—dylematy władzy i wolności, [in:] Kultura—Polityka—Dyplomacja studia ofiarowane 
prof. Jaremie Maciszewskiemu w  sześćdziesiątą rocznicę jego urodzin, Warszawa 1990; 
Uruszczak W., Sejm walny koronny w  latach 1506-1540, Warszawa 1980; Sejm walny 
w  epoce złotego wieku (1493-1569), [in:] Społeczeństwo obywatelskie i  jego reprezentacja 
(1493-1993), J. Bardach, Warszawa 1995; Sucheni-Grabowska A. Refleksje nad sejmami 
czasów zygmuntowskich, Przegląd Historyczny, 75 (1984), 4, Sejm w  latach 1540-1586, 
[in:] Historia sejmu polskiego J. Bardach 1, Warszawa 1984; J. Dzięgielewski, Izba poselska 
w  systemie władzy Rzeczypospolitej w  czasach Władysława IV, Warszawa 1992; Procesy 
destrukcyjne w ustroju mieszanym Rzeczypospolitej, [in:] Dziedzictwo 69-87. 
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in the Iberian Peninsula, where the Cortes of individual provinces were gradually 
losing their rights2, as well as in Sweden, Denmark or certain German states. 
With such a dualism the case of the Sicilian parliamentary system seems to be 
interesting.3 A direction of political transformations in the Kingdom of Sicily 
is clearly visible through an analogy with the history of the parliamentarianism 
of the First Polish Republic. A comparison of both parliamentary institutions: 
the Sicilian Parliament and the General Sejm enables to determine the level of 
similarity and, as a consequence, to classify the direction of development of the 
Sicilian parliamentarism.4
A typical feature of both the Sicilian Parliament and the General Sejm was 
a set of analogical “acts” and “gestures” of the bodies making up both the insti-
tutions. A session of both parliaments started with an opening ceremony. The 
next stage was a debate in individual chambers. An official winding up of the 
parliament took place during closing procedures. The fact that in Sicily there 
was no element of plenary sessions (providing for participation of three classes 
represented in the Sejm), which is present in the system of the Polish Republic, 
resulted probably from an absence of the monarchical factor. Analogical are 
also gestures of both bodies expressed in the speech from the throne, donativo 
documents, grazii sets, gravaminis or acts of disagreement. In both cases there 
2 Izabela Katolicka many times emphasized the notion of an “absolute royal power”. 
(Mączak 128) 
3 Boscolo A., Parlamento siciliano e parlamento sardo, motivi per una ricerca comune, 
[in:] Mélanges Antonio Marongiu, Palermo-Agrigento, 1966. Publication subsidiée par le 
Gouvernement de la Région Sicilienne, à l’occasion du XXe anniversaire de 1’Autonomie. 
Bruxelles-Palermo, 1967. In-8°, idem Sul braccio reale nei parlamenti sardi del periodo 
aragonese. in: Congrès International des Sciences Historiques, Rome, 1955, Xth International 
Congress for Historical Sciences, avec une préface de H. M. CAM. Publication subsidiée par 
l’UNESCO. Louvain, 1958. In-8° 133-140. Acta curiarum Regni Sardiniae, I Parlamenti 
di Alfonso il Magnanimo, a  cura di A. Boscolo, Cagliari 1991; H. Koenigsberger, The 
government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain, 1969, idem, The parliaments of Sicily and the 
Spanish empire, [in:] Mélanges…; Il Parlamento di Sicilia del 1615, a  cura di F. Vergara, 
Bonanno 1991; Il parlamento di Sicilia di 1612, a cura di V., Sciuti Russi, Catania 1985, 
D’Agostino G., Parlamento e societa nel Regno di Napoli, secoli XV-XVII; Caracciolo F., Il 
Parlamento nel Regno di Napoli durante la dominazione spagnola, Titone V., Il parlamento 
siciliano nell’eta moderna [Mélanges…; Fonseca C., De curia semel in anno facienda”. 
L’esperienza parlamentare in Europa e il caso Sicilia dal medioevo all’eta moderna], [in:] 
De curia semel in anno facienda L’esperienza parlamentare siciliana nel contesto europeo, 
C. Piazza, Il parlamento siciliano dal secolo XII al secolo XIX; A. Marongiu, Il Parlamento in 
Italia nel medio evo e nell’età moderna. 
4 Both institutions were compared in Kozak (2011, 171-202). 
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was a system of bargaining between a monarch and a parliament: in the Sicilian 
assembly taking a form of petitions (grazii)accepted by a monarch in exchange 
for taxes (donativo). A  characteristic feature of both assemblies are relatively 
regularly held debates throughout the period of their functioning. Hence, the 
elements common for both institutions are included in a range of procedures 
connected with their function. 
Until 1412 in Sicily the assembly was attended by a monarch and three 
chambers: noble, clerical and middle-class. However, the lack of ordo interme-
diusis was apparent. Although institutions comparable with the Polish Sen-
ate existed, none of them participated in debates as a separate parliamentary 
chamber. Therefore, despite similarities in the area of functions and rights, 
a fundamental difference is visible in structural terms. The lack of the role of 
an intermediary between a monarch and parliamentary chambers was tanta-
mount to the lack of material reflection of the aristocratic factor and, as a con-
sequence, to a disturbance of the balance on which the mixed system is based. 
An equally important issue affecting the interpretation of the political system 
of the Kingdom of Sicily is a position of a monarch. The fact of his absence 
makes a fundamental difference in functioning of the systems being compared. 
The beginning of the fifteenth century in South Italy brought about changes, 
namely a personal union of Italian states under the sceptre of one monarch. 
This fact took place after the period of one hundred years of building similar, 
but unique for each of the countries, representative structures and procedures 
connected with their functioning. The representative body of Sicily, after elect-
ing a monarch, significantly strengthened its position in spite of chaos caused 
by the dynastic crisis persisting for almost the whole fourteenth century. The 
constitutions promulgated by the Aragonian monarchs: Frederic III or Martin 
Elder are its evidence. 
The reign of Alfonso the Great brought next very important changes. This 
king brought together under his sceptre the Kingdom of Naples, Sicily and 
Sardinia paving a way for further political development of this region. The co-
operation of the monarch with representative bodies was very promising for fur-
ther development of those institutions. However, a political decision to appoint 
viceroys for each of those countries put an end to that cooperation. It brought 
serious consequences for the political system of Sicily, namely the absence of 
a monarch on the island. The present considerations seem to give one of the 
possible answers to the compelling problem of identification of the political 
system of the Kingdom of Sicily. Introduction of the institution of viceroy elim-
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inated the monarchical factor from active participation in the political life of the 
island. Hence, despite the parliament’s functioning slow-down of the develop-
ment process and directing it towards mixed government could be caused by the 
physical absence of three factors. Since the beginning of the fifteenth century 
a monarch was represented by a viceroy. However, Sicilians perceived the rank 
of that official as not equal with the monarch, which can be proven by the acts 
of protest against his activity, addressed to the monarch residing in Madrid.5
A consequence of replacing a king with an institution of viceroy was the 
improper interpretation of the state representation. In the opinion of publi-
cists defending the thesis about a  state as an organism and a mixed political 
system realizing this assumption, there are three representative components of 
the Polish Republic: a monarch, a body corresponding to the aristocratic factor 
and the general public. In Sicily eliminating the monarchical factor from active 
participation in political life disturbed a balance of the political system. On one 
hand, we have to deal with three classes of the Polish Republic representing the 
state in the Sejm. On the other, the physical lack of that first Sejm class, which 
is a king, finally leads to the situation when bills are addressed to a monarch 
on behalf of a parliament. This procedure indicates a non-parliamentary status 
of a monarch, a situation completely different from the Polish political reality. 
In appeals to the representation of state included in the Italian sources 
there are no appeals to a  king: “Parlamentum sic tria Bracchia potest facere 
totum id, quod potest totus populus siculus & totum Regnum” (Muta 1612, 
VI: 22). Such situation did not predetermine a  supra-parliamentarian status 
of a monarch in the Sicilian system or in the minds of Sicilians, as certain re-
searches try to emphasize.6 It only confirms the fact of his non-parliamentary 
like position resulting from the simple, already mentioned reason—his absence 
on the island. What is more, participation of a monarch in the representation of 
a state was closely related to identifying that state with a “virtual being” rather 
than with a personality of the monarch. Besides, the concept of representation 
should not be understood in contemporary terms. The weakness of a parlia-
ment was due, among other things, to the lack of its clearly specified concept. 
The formulas: “per tucto el dicto Regno et per li tri brachii di quillo, noviter 
congregate” included in the constitutions may be an evidence that the concept 
of the Kingdom and three chambers was treated equivalently. In reality, not 
5 Il parlamento di Sicilia di 1612, a cura di V. Sciuti Russi, Catania (1985, 122). 
6 For the analysis of the representation relation: monarch–parliament, see Marongiu 
(481). 
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only the Italian one, a viceroy had an influence on election of the members of 
braccia. Due to the fact that a clear concept of representation of the Kingdom’s 
citizens was not created, the relations that could separate the government from 
parliament members disappeared. Hence, a custom that appeared in the parlia-
mentary procedure to pass the votes held by parliament members absent at the 
meeting onto the treasurer of the Kingdom, who was a royal official.7
Irrespective of structural differences, procedural discrepancies are also 
observed. The most important seems to be the issue of petitions addressed to 
a monarch and tax decisions taken by an assembly. A change in the sequence 
of both “acts”, putting an emphasize in the Sicilian Parliament on the priority 
of taking a decision concerning donativo, was a result of changes which start-
ed with the appointment of a  viceroy and the lack of a  direct contact with 
a monarch. Therefore, this gesture did not have such a meaning as in the re-
alities of the First Polish Republic, however it was not deprived thereof. The 
issue of a  length of a debate also entailed serious consequences. By virtue of 
the Henrician Articles the General Sejm was convened every two years for six 
weeks. However, a debate of the Sicilian assembly lasted only a few days. This 
fact should be explained, on one side, by the lack of a plenary discussion on 
the presented petitions and a potential decision of a monarch concerning their 
acceptance, but on the other—by elimination of the necessity to hold a debate 
due to the adoption of fix tax rates. 
Other difficulties, which hindered the process of crystalizing the principles 
of mixture, can be seen in other aspects of the Sicilian political life. Elimination 
of personal participation of a monarch in a debate was an important obstacle 
to evolution of the then assembly in the direction set by modern parliaments 
of the Polish Republic and England. It is because a balance, which made an 
effective parliamentary debate possible, was shaken up. An absence of a king 
preventing a constructive discussion on the bills vetoed by the king is a symp-
tom of changes materialized in gradual elimination of the preliminary function 
of an assembly—dialogue with a monarch. According to the source materials, 
the period of time between preparation of bills by a parliament and receipt of 
a king’s response was about two years. Hence, such situation was a significant 
barrier in communication with a court. A changing perception of a monarch’s 
role materially manifest in a change in the formulas of documents promulgated 
by a monarch. 
7 The meaning of the representation concept in relations to the Sicilian Parliament 
was presented by Titone (1967, 188). 
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The formula “Placet Regiae Maiestati” which since the times of Alfonso 
the Great started to appear as a permanent element of the promulgated con-
stitutions, was a material expression of the royal majesty’s authority. However 
this majesty, along with isolation of the monarchical factor, started to be per-
ceived in a way completely different that it used to be in the realities of the First 
Polish Republic. This obviously had an impact on the position of the Sicilian 
Parliament, which became weaker. It should be emphasized once more that 
a non-parliamentary status was tantamount to his absence rather than his su-
premacy. In Sicily, for the reasons mentioned above, granting such a status to 
a monarch was neither obvious than possible. As a consequence, in the opinion 
of contemporary society the operating political system might not correspond 
with the model of a mixed political system, which could become one of the 
most important reasons for the lack of references to Sicily in treatises of Italian 
political writers of early modern times, dedicated to the issue of a mixed gov-
ernment; it is because Sicily had no “king in the Parliament” as England did, or 
a king as a separated class in the Sejm as Poland did. 
The reasons behind a  peculiar status of the Sicilian Parliament may lie, 
among other things, in the geopolitical situation of the island in the first half 
of the fifteenth century. The fact of a union between the Italian states and the 
Kingdom of Spain gives a chance for a comparative look at the solutions intro-
duced in the Mediterranean Sea. The Spanish monarchy allowed for retaining 
provincial parliaments of a separatist nature. Such a situation was observed not 
only in South Italy, as on the Iberian Peninsula debates in individual regions 
were held separately.8 So, on one hand we deal with tendencies uniting par-
liamentary structures, but on the other with the lack of interference into the 
existing particularism. A  spectacular effect of the policy pursued by the six-
teenth-century Spanish monarchs, probably reflecting the divide et impera prin-
ciple, was a suppression of the potential growth of significance of Italian states 
by a failure to appoint a representative body common for those areas. 
Hence, in this case we have to deal with the state of facts opposite to the 
then situation in Poland. The appointment of the Sejm common for the Pol-
ish-Lithuanian Commonwealth led to strengthening of the principles of the 
constitutional monarchy and streamlined the operation of the state (Uruszczak 
2005). The fact that the importance of functioning of a nation-wide represent-
ative institution was neglected might have become one of the reasons behind 
8 The General Assembly of the Spanish Cortes took place only in 1724, after the Italian 
territories fell under the reign of the Austrian dynasty. 
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a gradual decline of the Kingdom of Spain. The policy pursued by monarchs 
from the Habsburg dynasty towards representative assemblies brought negative 
consequences, significantly affecting their development. This process was mani-
fested on one side in intensification of strivings of individual groups, but on the 
other—in a court’s efforts to minimize a rank of assemblies. 
In the situation faced among others by the Sicilian assembly, we need to 
consider the fact that the Spanish monarchy did not make the same gesture as 
with the decision concerning the States-General from 1614. Despite the exist-
ing barriers the Sicilian parliament proceeded regularly throughout the whole 
period of the reign of the Habsburg dynasty. Such circumstances indicate rather 
that a significance of that authority was sufficient enough to effectively prevent 
the Habsburg monarchs from taking a negligent attitude towards its members, 
but insufficient to direct development of the procedures towards parliamenta-
rism of modern times. Placing the Kingdom of Sicily along any of the evolu-
tionary lines of the political system presents some problems, because the local 
parliament did not possess the attributes enabling an unambiguous classifica-
tion. On the one hand, the Sicilian parliamentarianism did not reach the level 
worked out by the flagship examples of the Polish Republic, Venice and Eng-
land, but on the other—it does not provide examples of consent for introducing 
the absolute power. It seems that we deal here with the “third solution” of some 
kind. 
The whole proceedings of the Sicilian parliament show certain attributes 
supporting the validity of the thesis concerned. Contrary to the Sejm of the 
Republic of Poland, the scope of prerogatives enjoyed by the assembly of the 
island was much narrower, nevertheless that authority had an essential impact 
on shaping a political life in the state. Irrespective of the necessity to get parlia-
mentary acts approved by the monarch, the activity of the assembly influenced 
the legislation shaping process. However, the already mentioned fact of a king’s 
absence blocked a fruitful discussion on vetoed bills. A long period of time be-
tween submission of bills and their acceptance or rejection left the one an only 
solution in the hands of parliament members, which was used many times: to 
come back to the vetoed proposal during the next sessions and then to refer it 
again to a king. The suppression of development of parliamentary procedures 
towards strengthening the assembly intensified the already analysed fact of 
a lack of tendencies unifying parliamentary authorities, leading to domination 
of individual pursuits unifying parliamentary authorities, an effect of which was 
a domination of individual efforts. 
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Under these circumstances the events took place which indicated that there 
was a  rivalry between the territories, which practically had common interests. 
Undoubtedly, it was a factor having a negative impact not only on the position of 
assemblies functioning within those territories, but also on the states themselves. 
Well-known is the position of representative bodies in countries ruled by absolute 
monarchy. Therefore, it is clear that the reign of the Habsburg monarchs in the 
Kingdom of Sicily was not an exemplification of domination of an individual. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that parliament sessions were convened regular-
ly. The Spanish monarchy allowed for the parliament’s activity, but at the same 
time effectively restricted its further development. As a result, this institution was 
falling into deeper and deeper malaise and general stagnation. The operational 
procedures were not evolving towards strengthening of the assembly’s position, 
however gradual reduction of powers, as well as progressive internal degeneration 
of the island’s parliament did not give way to the unlimited will of the ruler. 
Taking a decision on taxation still was one of the key prerogatives of the 
parliament, which indicates that the parliament was not neglected by a mon-
arch. Regardless the changed position of the assembly, the parliament was be-
stowed with the authority very important for the political life of the island: the 
Sicilian citizenship was granted only by its unanimous resolution. The status 
of a citizen was a precondition for performing public functions, including sit-
ting in the parliament. Hence, decisive functions in this area had an impact on 
blocking the inflow of foreigners into the circles of the assembly members. 
The above analysed differences in the functioning of the Polish and the Si-
cilian Parliaments determined, among other things, by the political situation in 
those areas, show that in both systems the monarchical factor was perceived dif-
ferently. However, the source materials relating to the operation of the Sicilian 
Parliament does not allow to rank that body equally with the French or even 
British representative body. From one point of view, because the position of the 
French monarch and the Sicilian king seems to be the same, the positions of 
the parliaments of both states cannot be nevertheless equated to any extent. The 
examples of vetoes against the proposals of the monarch and the contractual na-
ture of the adopted donativo and submitted bills are an evident proof of a strong 
position of the Sicilian Parliament, comparing with the General Sejm, contrary 
to the States-General of France, which had not been convened since 1614 or in-
comparably weaker power of the English Parliament than in the Polish Republic.9 
9 For the position of the English Parliament in the era of Tudors and Stuarts see: 
Choińska-Mika.
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After all, functioning of a representative body being able to force its bills 
through is an unquestionable proof that the political system is neither absolute 
nor monarchical (Marongiu 485). So, the attempt to classify the Kingdom of 
Sicily on one side of two poles of political transformation is not a  clear-cut 
matter. The political system in the Kingdom of Sicily is incompatible with the 
model pattern of mixed governance, which was the political system of the First 
Polish Republic. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is a lack of interpre-
tation of the Sicilian political system as a mixed republic. However, a question 
arises: how we should characterize that system of a political government when 
it is now obvious that it was not absolute. 
The factual situation described above was reflected in the then journalistic 
writing. Two different directions, into which two states with the initially iden-
tical political systems drove off, were expressed in the renaissance of antique 
visions of the state: Platonic and Aristotelian. Serious consequences, being also 
a symptom of rivalry of both visions, were reflected in a kind of practical–po-
litical action, which was an effect of a different cognitive method realized with-
in both imaginations. In this question a competition between the two visions 
came into play in various moments of history, and the clash from the turn of the 
Middle Ages and the Modern Era is one of the most significant. 
The Platonic vision identifies a  state with the elaborated system of solu-
tions, the aim of which is to introduce an order in a chaotic–natural society, ow-
ing to which the state will get closer to the ideal state of being. This way, a state 
becomes a rational, imposed formation, which—made in the image of the idea 
has nothing to do with the human Nature. On the other hand, the Aristotelian 
vision connected the genesis of the state and related concepts of power and 
freedom with the concept of Nature. According to this vision, a state is a con-
sequence of the process of the society’s maturing up to this organizational stage. 
The process, which is materially expressed by gradually reaching the subsequent 
stages of coexistence, i. e. a family, neighbouring community, to finally reach 
the level of interpersonal cooperation, a state being a form of it. 
According to Aristotle, a state is a being independent of others and does not 
owe its reason for existence to anything. So, according to the postulates of the 
Platonic vision a state is a purely technical structure. As a consequence of this 
assumption, a policy is identified with a set of developed mechanical solutions, 
the aim of which is to create a certain social creature. A creature which would 
try to bring the chaotic reality of our earthly world to the idea of a state. It goes 
without saying that such solutions, if adopted without any reference to reality, 
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are purely mechanical attempts to adjust the reality to ideal, imaginary rules. 
Such an approach is not acceptable in the naturalistic imagination where the 
shape of reality shall not be determined by solutions. Quite the contrary—it 
is the reality which has to influence the form of the adopted rules. Such an 
approach is a  logical consequence of the slogan recommending to follow the 
nature. Both the system of absolutism, where a monarch is a subject of power, 
and the system of mixed government where a state is regarded as a subject of 
power fit into the framework of both visions.10
The mixed system eulogized by European writers could not and did not 
constitute a reference to the reality of a political island. Despite the functioning 
of a parliament, evident was the absence of the factor indispensable for proper 
implementation of the rules of regimen mixtum, which was ordo intermedius. 
Writers faced also the problem how to comment the fact of the monarch’s ab-
sence. Due to the circumstances making it impossible to admire the mixed 
system, but simultaneously excluding absolutism journalistic writers had to find 
an intermediate solution: the idea of an agreement between a ruler and minions. 
Apart from the preference for certain political system, the authors of mod-
ern political treatises concentrated also on interpretation of a state and a place 
of monarch in his government. This interpretation underwent serious transfor-
mation, which concerned the moment when the renaissance naturalism and 
the modern constitutionalism drifted apart from one another. This turn is also 
perceived in the new understanding of the concept of a state, differing from the 
previous one, which was promoted by followers of the naturalistic imagination. 
In political writings a state began to be perceived in the categories of an inter-
personal agreement. 
The Aristotelian viewpoint defining a state as a being originating from Na-
ture and totally independent from a human will, was replaced by including this 
human volitive factor.11 The circles of naturalists are familiar with the concept 
10 A thorough analysis of the reception of a state in both visions was conducted by 
J. Ekes in the study Natura—Wolność—Władza (2002). 
11 The testimonies of this new interpretation can be found, inter alia, in Danaeus, 
who repeated after Aristotle that “the political power is very different from the power 
of a householder”, but on the other hand emphasized that the “power of a householder 
is recommended by nature, while political power—by voice and approval of people” 
(Danaeus, 39, transl. after Ekes 2002, 121). This issue was similarly treated by Althusius, 
who regarding a state wrote as follows: “I do not call the members of this body individual 
people, but families, associations, numerous boroughs and towns concluding a  mutual 
agreement on appointment of one body of the Polish Republic as a consequence of uniting. 
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of a contract. However, they treat this concept in different categories. They be-
lieve that it is not a state, which is a subject of human will, but only its political 
system.12
In journalistic writings of the southern part of the Apennine Peninsula 
we do not find references to the mixed system, but references to the contrac-
tual solution of the issue of a political system appear quite often. The concept 
of a contract significantly differs from the social contract theory developed by 
Rousseau. A difference is that an agreement is not a  voluntary interpersonal 
contract concluded in order to create a state, but an agreement between a na-
tion and a monarch. Such a contract relates to the principle of organisation of 
that state, namely a political system.13
The elements of this theory appear already in the works of such writers as 
Nicholas of Cusa and Hieronymus Savonarola. Antonio Scaino, a priest and 
philosopher also refers to the conditions agreed between a nation and a duke, 
the aim of which is to limit the power of the latter. He indicates the opportunity 
of a political system transformation by those nations, which being aware that 
they have been deprived of the possibility to rule due to various reasons elect 
a ruler. During designation an agreement is concluded, under which minions 
agree for being ruled in this way restricting a  monarchical power (1578, II: 
18b). According to Scaino, the majority of monarchies functioning at that time 
proceeded following this principle. 
Implementation of the agreement became the basis for identifying differ-
ences between the monarchical political system and tyranny. Whenever the king 
observes the constitution and the rights presented by electing minions, we deal 
with a limited monarchy. Whenever a monarch ignores the binding privileges, 
he becomes a usurper and a tyrant (Scaino 1578). Joining the discussion, Gio-
vanni Botero expressed the opinion that except for a pope “all rulers have their 
power limited by constitutions and agreements concluded with nations” (Vene-
tia 1596, II [IV]: 147). A Jesuit, mathematician and philologist Luigi Giuglaris 
Such a body and an associations is bound by concord and confidence mutually expressed 
and accepted”. (Althusius, 55, transl. after Ekes 2002, 121). 
12 R. Bellarmino, De laicis 1772-1773 (qtd. : Ekes 2002). 
13 The result of this agreement was pointed at by the French writer stating that: “Ces 
Parlemens sontéstablis par forme de contacts faicts par le Roy avec le peuple, et pour le 
soulagementd’iceluy, Institution ou droit des François ou nouvelle conference des coustumes 
de France reduitesen epitome selon des tiltres du Droit par Guy Coquelle” Paris, 1642, cf. 
R. Mattei, La concezione contrattualistica, [in:] Il pensiero politico II (204). 
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(1607-1653) approached this problem in the same way, pointing at the essence 
of the concluded agreement, namely mutual obligations of both parties—chiefs 
and minions. Not explicitly said by the author, but an evident result of a mon-
arch breaking the agreement conditions, tantamount to the transformation of 
a political system into tyranny, is a release of minions from the obligation of 
obedience.14 We can learn potential consequences of breaking the pact condi-
tions by a duke also from another work by Antonio Santacroce (1598-1641), 
since 1627 a nuncio in Poland, doctor of legal science. 
The fundamental thesis pursued by the scholar comes down to the state-
ment that the ruler who backfired on their own nation deserves a penalty of 
being ruled by someone else. However, the author believes that minions should 
refuse obedience not only to the ruler himself; also his successors should be de-
prived of the right to sit on the throne (Santacroce 1649). As the duke Alessan-
dro Anguissola from Piacenza states, invoking the authority of ancient thinkers, 
the observance of the given word by a ruler is a basis for justice and stability of 
states.15
The problem of mutual obligations of a nation and a ruler was addressed 
by Scypion di Castro, a Pope’s advisor and an author of guidelines for the future 
viceroy of Sicily, who had an excellent knowledge of the Sicilian politics (di 
Castro 1992). In one of his works he emphasized the significance of the duty 
of minions’ obedience to a monarch on one side, but on the other—a kind of 
a debt of a ruler towards his nation. A failure to settle this debt poses a risk of 
rising against a ruler and favouring another person with confidence (di Castro 
1601, 17). Scipione Ammirato from Lecce indicates that this type of agreement 
is one of the forms of a relation between a monarch and minions (Ammirato 
1599, 16). However, this problem was presented in a specific way by a lawyer 
from Salerno, Mark Antonio Pistilli in the work Commentariorum de instruendo 
Principe imago, published in 1603 in Naples. 
14 “Gli uomini furono che, per non vivere senza capo come gli eretici acefali, in questo 
patto convennero: che alcuni, sovrastando padroni, amministrassero buona giustizia; altri, 
servendo sudditi, si segnalassero nel merito dell’obedienza” (Giuglaris, 80). 
15 Il Prencipe, per l’istessa ragione di stato, è tenuto all’ osservanza della parola, poiché 
questo secondo Cicerone, Platone et Valerio Massimo, è fondamento della giustizia (…) alli quali 
sono appogiati tutti gli stati e le confederazioni, A Anguissola, Del buon governo del prencipe, 
Bibl. Naz. di Torino, sygn. N. III. 6. Senza la quale [osservanza] non può essere commertio né 
communicazione fra gli uomini, talmente che se il Principe, anche d’assoluta podestà, non fosse 
rispettoso della fede del contratto fatto coi sudditi […] niuno si troverebbe che volesse con lui 
contrattare, A. Anguissola. 
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Despite the fact that in the content of the work religious strands inter-
mingle with political themes, the author’s views seem to be clear. According to 
Pistilli what raises no doubts is a contractual form of mutual relations between 
a ruler and minions, the relation resulting, among other things, from the norms 
applicable to civil society (Pistili 1603, 9; qtd. Mattei 2, 12). Another interpre-
tation of a contractual nature of the relation between a ruler and minions is giv-
en also by a lawyer, Giovanni Antonio Palazzo. In the work Discorso del governo 
e della ragion vera di stato, published in Naples in 1604, a year after publishing 
the document of Pistilli, Palazzo returned to the idea of a contract. In Palazzo’s 
view, an agreement is a  source of legitimacy of a  sovereign’s power. Promises 
made during the election become the obligations that bind a ruler. Palazzo em-
phasized this very act, during which—as he thought—a tacit pact (tacito patto) 
is forged between an elector and minions appointing him to sit on the throne. 
By virtue of this pact, minions promise to be obedient and respect the dignity of 
the rulers in order to maintain the state and defend it against enemies. On their 
side the rulers promise to implement and observe all the matters, which are 
necessary for sound governance. To precisely formulate his thoughts the author 
adds that minions, on their side, are obliged to give blood and property, while 
the obligation of dukes is benevolence and wisdom. 
Continuing, Palazzo tries to outline the type and essence of such a mutual 
contract. He believes that this pact can be defined neither as a sales nor an ex-
change agreement, because virtues cannot be won with the precious ores, but 
with honour and eternal goods. On the other hand, rulers cannot exchange 
their virtues for temporal goods (44). According to Palazzo, improper defini-
tions of that contract resulted from its inappropriate interpretation. People tried 
to discern its essence in the needs of a state connected with an order and rights 
to be guaranteed by a ruler directly or through his officials. 
In exchange, minions were to endow him with temporal goods, which are 
not necessarily proportionate to the sovereign’s virtues and merits. According to 
the author, when nations hand over their temporal and eternal goods to rulers 
and give their spiritual wealth to them they conclude a unique pact of friend-
ship with the society (patto di compagna). However, the sense of such an agree-
ment lies in mutual benefits, as minions benefit from benevolence and wisdom 
of rulers, while the latter serve citizens of the state to achieve a common goal: 
happiness, which is possible only in the optimal state, free from external and in-
ternal perils. Emphasizing the legitimacy of such an effect of joint cooperation, 
Palazzo indicates that the observance of that agreement is a precondition for 
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stability (fermezza) of dukes and stabilization of states as a source of the reason 
of state and the art of politics (47-48). 
Palazzo dedicates the second part of his work to the issue of the reason of 
state in relation to the contractual nature of the ducal power. Despite many 
repetitions referring to the already presented standpoint towards mutual ob-
ligations, he illustrates the potentially destructive role of actions motivated by 
the reason of state. Whereas such actions should result from the supreme goal, 
which is to observe the provisions of the concluded agreement, at that time 
people were aware of the fact that the argument of the reason of state was many 
times used to justify the activities detrimental to the state. Such conduct of 
a ruler ignoring the concluded agreement constitutes a threat to safety and sta-
bilization of a state.16
The views of Pistilli and Palazzo about the issue of a contract differ in their 
approaches to the contract’s durability. According to the first scholar, the agree-
ment may be broken. The second believes that it has a permanent nature because 
nations irrevocably waive part of their rights for the benefit of a ruler, vowing 
obedience, while rulers on their side should reciprocate with wise governance. 
The concept of the contractual nature of the relations between a monarch 
and minions was considered, inter alia, by Marco Giurba, a Sicilian lawyer, in 
his work Consilia seu decisiones criminales. He supported the thesis that a duke 
could not withdraw from the agreement concluded with his minions (1626, 
662) [qtd. Mattei, 2: 231]. As a citizen of Messina, Giurba spoke in favour of 
defence of the rights granted to the city referring to the idea of a contract. He 
stated, among other things, that a monarch could not change the terms of the 
contract by virtue of his power (663). Neither was he authorized to revoke earli-
er granted privileges, as they constituted a part of the agreement (Giurba, 663). 
The author of an anonymous work Trattato della politica written in the 
second half of the seventeenth century, stated that the monarch’s power could 
be limited by a certain type of agreement with minions while the monarch was 
subject to ius naturae et gentis. He distinguished a few types of limited monar-
chies referring to the then functioning governments in certain European states. 
He first reflected on the situation in the Kingdom of Aragon, where the legal 
body that restricted the ruler’s deeds was a  tribunal called Justicia de Aragon, 
whose task was to settle disputes between a monarch and minions. Referring 
16 He used a  fake argument of the reason of state attendendo i  Principi alli propri 
profitti, si viene ad abusare questa proprietà e convenienza di patto, e a cesare il suo debito fine 
(40-44). 
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to the system existing in the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the author 
pointed at the fact that minions in that state could refuse the obedience to the 
ruler in case of his failure to observe the binding law. Under these circumstances 
the monarch could be legally revoked. However—as the author indicated—this 
procedure could not be carried out by individual citizens, but only by “the 
whole body of the nation and state”.17 According to the writer, a decision of 
Portuguese people to get independent from the Kingdom of Spain was fully 
justified, because the Spanish monarchs were not willing to observe the privi-
leges valid in that area. The longing for the times of apparently fair rulings of 
the Aragonian dynasty in Naples was clearly seen in the fragment dedicated to 
the rebellion from 1642. Having considered the Masaniell uprising as fully jus-
tified, the author did not direct his hatred against the ruling elite in the capital, 
but against the rulers from the Habsburg dynasty as usurpers on the Naples 
throne, the successors of Ferdinand the Catholic, “who was the first to deceit-
fully take the throne of the Kingdom of Naples”.18
In the seventeenth century, due to the disputes between the Sicilian towns, 
the concept of an agreement between these towns and a monarch was raised on 
many occasions. An example of such a conflict was the dispute between Palermo 
and Messina concerning the place of residence of a viceroy, so de facto about 
which of these two towns the status of the Kingdom’s capital should be granted. 
Hence to prove the precedence of one of them over the other, the disputants 
referred to the contact with the monarch based on the privileges granted in 
exchange for the adoption of donativo (qtd. Mattei 2, 231). 
17 While outlining the contents of this treatise Persico writes that the author makes the 
following distinction: “nel discorrere dei principatistabilisce una differenza tra i monarchi la 
cui autorità sui vassali è vincolata da certi freni e da certe convenzioni, e quelli la cui azione 
di governo non è sottoposta che al „ius naturae et gentis”. Le monarchie temperate hanno 
tipi diversi, ed egli esamina i caratteri di ciascuna di esse, cominciando dall’aragonese, col 
suo tribunale detto „Justicia de Aragon” che decideva delle contese tra il Principe e i vassalli. 
Cita le Provincie Unite d’Olanda, ove i  sudditi erano sciolti dall’obbligo di fedeltà, se il 
Sovrano non avesse osservato i diritti, e riconosce, in casi molto gravi, il diritto di abbattere 
l’autorità regia, ma non già ad alcuni invidui, bensi a „tutto il corpo del popolo e dello 
Stato”, per non incorrere nella taccia di ribellione. Ebbero ragione i Catalani nel 1641, come 
l’avevano avuta i Portoghesi, a staccarsi dalla Spagna, i cui Re avevano violati i loro privilegi 
e le loro franchigie” (Persico 1912, 408). 
18 “La rivoluzione di Masaniello è da lui pienamente giustificata [. . . ] giacchè egli non 
si scaglia contro i cattivi governanti, ma contro gli usurpatori del reame, contro i successori 
di Ferdinado il Cattolico ”il quale fu il primo che con tradimento occupò al re Federico 
d’Aragona, re legittimo, questo regno” (Persico, 409). 
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However, some of the scholars investigating this problem say that the po-
litical situation in the Renaissance Italy did not favour the development of con-
tractualistic concepts due to the dominant concept of plenitudo potestatis of 
a ruler (Mattei 2, 204). There was an area where not only such conditions ap-
peared, but the functioning government apparatus allowed the practical appli-
cation of such a concept—the Kingdoms of South Italy. Due to the lack of the 
monarchic factor’s direct participation in governance, the representative bodies 
functioning in those states were not identified with the functioning of a mixed 
political system. Yet, they became a starting point for discussions on the idea of 
an agreement. 
Such a  conception, undoubtedly proving that the monarch was granted 
an unlimited power, was reflected in political writings more strongly than the 
concept of regimen mixtum due to the political situation prevailing in that area. 
Hence, in the local political conditions of South Italy the concept of contract 
acquired a specific meaning. The general idea presented by Pistilli or Palazzo in 
the writings referring to the specific activities in that matter may be treated as 
a conclusion of the agreement, on the basis of which donativi were adopted in 
exchange for the approval of the privileges.19 The interpretation of the political 
system of the Kingdom of Sicily was expressed in development of the idea of 
contractualism, which by explaining the relation between a  state and a  ruler 
may be a kind of a golden mean between both visions. Therefore, here we would 
also have to deal with the “third solution”—a theoretical interpretation of the 
political and constitutional situation of the island put into the framework of an 
agreement between the minions and the monarch. 
19 Capitula Regni stante donativo dicuntur contractus, Don Garcia Mastrillo, De 
Magistratibus 65 cf. R. Mattei, Il pensiero politico italiano (2: 232). In another of the sixteenth 
century works we also find a confirmation of the fact that the act of granting privileges took 
the nature of a contract: . Privilegium et statutum tunc dicitur transire in contractum, quando 
aliquod conceditur, non simpliciter, sed commensurandum ob aliquod factum aut dationem, vel 
praeteritam vel futuram impletam vel implendam, ex parte eius cui conceditur, D. Lancellotto 
Conrado Laudense, Templum omnium iudicum Pontificiae, Cesareae, Regiae, inferiorisque 
potestatis, Venetiis, (1575) 76 [qtd. Mattei, Il pensiero politico italiano 2, 232]. 
